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ABSTRACT
System trespassing, which refers to the unauthorized access of computer systems, has
rapidly become a worldwide phenomenon. Despite growing concern, criminological literature
has paid system trespassing little attention. The current study utilizes data gathered from a
Chinese computer network to examine system trespasser behavior after exposure to one of three
warning messages: an altruistic message used for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction
threat (warning 2), and an ambiguous threat (warning 3). More specifically, the current study
examines the temporal order of various keystroke commands to determine if some keystroke
commands are used as a tactical skill to avoid detection. The results of a series of bivariate crosstabulations show that encountering a standard legal threat or ambiguous threat increase the early
use of reconnaissance commands; however, these findings were not pronounced enough to gain
statistical significance. Since the current study is the first known test of particularistic restrictive
deterrence in cyberspace it informs those working in cyber security, whilst expanding the scope
of the theory.
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Introduction
System trespassing, the unauthorized access of computer systems, has rapidly become a
worldwide phenomenon with an estimated annual cost to the global economy of over $400
billion (McAfee, 2014). The average cost of system trespassing to United States companies in
2015 has been estimated at roughly $15 million (Ponemon Institute, 2013). Additionally, at the
individual level, system trespassers (also known as hackers) can gain access to sensitive
information, which can be used to fuel identity theft or even to invade one’s personal privacy.
Despite growing concern, the criminological literature has paid system trespassing little
attention, until Maimon and colleagues’ (2014) study. Maimon and colleagues (2014) tested the
restrictive deterrent effect (i.e., efforts by active offenders to reduce their odds of getting caught
and punished) of warning banners on post-compromised target computers (also known as
honeypots). Maimon and colleagues (2014) employed honeypot computers built for the purpose
of being attacked, and conducted two experiments to examine the influence of warning banners
on the progression, frequency, and duration of system trespassing incidents. They found that a
warning banner significantly increases the rate of first system trespassing termination, and
decreases the duration of first trespassing incidents.
Due to the success of Maimon and colleagues’ (2014) study, the deterrent effect of
warning banners has gained an increasing amount of criminological attention (Jones, 2014;
Wilson, Maimon, Sobesto, & Cukier, 2015). Although subsequent studies have made significant
advancements in the current body of literature, additional research is imperative to gain a fuller
understanding of the restrictive deterrent effects of warning banners on system trespasser
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behavior. Particular attention should be paid to the existence of particularistic restrictive
deterrence in cyberspace. Particularistic restrictive deterrence is the modification of behavior
based on “tactical skills offenders use that make them less likely to be apprehended” (Jacobs,
1996a, p. 425). To date there is no known study of particularistic restrictive deterrence in
cyberspace, despite its relevance in the physical world.
Building upon the work of Maimon and colleagues (2014) and Jones (2014), the current
study seeks to address this need by examining the temporal order of keystroke commands logged
by system trespassers during an intrusion. Examining the temporal order of specific keystroke
commands in relation to the treatment or control conditions allows us to examine the extent to
which system trespassers modify their behavior after they encounter various warning messages.
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Literature Review
Theoretical Background
Paternoster (2010) conceptualized deterrence as the omission of a criminal act due to the
fear of punishment. The concept of deterrence, as defined by Paternoster (2010), originated from
the work of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Becarria’s classic work, On Crimes and
Punishment, was written in 1764 in an effort to challenge the rights of the state to punish crime.
Beccaria (1963 [1764]) described man as rational and self-interested, thus arguing that one will
not commit crime if the cost of committing crime is greater than the benefit. Becarria (1963
[1764]) contended that swift and certain punishment are the best forms of crime prevention, and
stated that if punishment is solely to prevent crime then punishment is unjust when its severity
exceeds that necessary to deter. Similarly, Bentham (1948 [1789]) believed that the duty of the
state was to promote societal happiness, by punishing and rewarding. Like Becarria (1963
[1764]), Bentham (1948 [1789]) believed in proportionality, deeming punishment that exceeds
that necessary to deter as unjust.
The early work of Becarria (1963 [1764]) and Bentham (1948 [1789]) became the
foundation for deterrence theory and classical criminology. However, in spite of a seemingly
well-developed theory explaining criminal behavior, criminologists shifted to a biological
positivist approach derived from works such as Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (Paternoster,
2010). Criminological distaste for deterrence theory was well documented with critiques such as
that offered by Von Hentig (1938). Von Hentig (1938) deemed deterrence theory as unreal and
simple-minded, stating that a large group of persons cannot be deterred by threats of law. He
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later argued that deterrence is destined to fail because the pleasure of committing a criminal act
is a near object, whereas the cost associated is a long distance danger (Von Hentig, 1938).
Similarly, other prominent criminologists dismissed deterrence as a viable crime control model
on the grounds that punishment is an ineffective way to change one’s behavior (Appel &
Peterson, 1965; Toby, 1964).
Deterrence theory came close to being discredited by the scientific community until two
studies appeared in 1968 and revitalized criminological interest (Paternoster, 2010). The first was
Gary Becker’s (1968) study, which took an economic approach to explaining criminal behavior
as an act of rational self-interest that can be understood like any other economic activity. Becker
(1968) argued that an offender’s decision to offend is made up of weighing the costs and benefits
of committing a crime in comparison to not committing a crime. Second was Gibbs’ (1968)
study, which exclusively focused on the effects of punishment on criminal behavior. More
importantly, Gibbs (1968) provided an example of how to empirically test deterrence theory by
examining the relationship between the certainty and severity of punishments across individual
states.
The work of Becker (1968) and Gibbs (1968) paved the way for contemporary
criminologists to provide subsequent empirical testing and a more in-depth consideration of
deterrence theory. The former led to the development of micro-social analyses of offender
decision-making, which in turn has become the study of perceptual deterrence (Paternoster,
2010). The latter led to the development of macro-social studies of deterrence and rates of crime
(Paternoster, 2010). Additional advancements include the work of Zimring and Hawkins (1973)
and Gibbs (1975), who further differentiated between general and specific deterrence. General
deterrence, as conceptualized by Gibbs (1975), refers to the effects of the threat of legal
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sanctions on the general public, whereas specific deterrence refers to the effects of legal
sanctions on those who have suffered it. Furthermore, Gibbs (1975) recognized that legal
sanctions can deter crime in various ways. For example, some individuals refrain from all forms
of unlawful acts to avoid punishment. Gibbs (1975) referred to such cases as absolute deterrence.
Paternoster (1989) differentiated between two types of absolute deterrence. First, there is
absolute deterrence when those who have never committed the offense in question continue to
refrain due to their fear of sanctions. Second, there is absolute deterrence when those who have
committed the offense in question subsequently refrain from continued participation due to their
fear of sanctions.
In other instances the threat of legal sanctions do not cause individuals to abstain fully
from crime, but instead curtail or modify their criminal behavior to reduce the risk of
punishment. Gibbs (1975) referred to such cases as restrictive deterrence. Moreover, restrictive
deterrence only applies to those who have committed the crime in question at least once, thus
deeming it a function of specific deterrence (Gibbs, 1975). In attempt to conceptually refine
restrictive deterrence, Paternoster (1989) contended that restrictive deterrence is a direct
reference to the frequency of subgroup offending. In other words, “restrictive deterrence can
only be observed for those who, during a given measurement period, have made the participation
decision” (Paternoster, 1989, p. 290). Simply put, restrictive deterrence only applies to those who
actively engage in the offense in question. Therefore, in accordance to Gibbs (1975) and
Paternoster (1989), restrictive deterrence is the curtailment or modification of criminal behavior
aimed to reduce the risk of sanctions for those who make the decision to participate in a
particular offense. Examples include drug dealers who limit their customer base to avoid selling
to undercover police officers (Jacobs, 1996a) and auto thieves who employ tactical skills to
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evade detection (Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014). These, along with other examples of offenders
reducing and modifying their behavior to avoid sanctions, are discussed in more depth below.
Paternoster (1989) examined the restrictive deterrent effects on a panel of high school
students’ perceptions of punishment severity and perceived certainty on four minor delinquent
offenses. Paternoster (1989) failed to find a restrictive deterrent effect for the perceived severity
of punishment. However, he did find that perceived certainty of punishment has a restrictive
deterrent effect, which is particularly strong for marijuana use (Paternoster, 1989). In other
words, Paternoster (1989) found that high school students curtail their offense frequency rather
than fully abstain from committing the illicit act when they believe that they will be sanctioned.
These preliminary findings suggested the utility of differentiating between absolute and
restrictive deterrence.
Jacobs (1996a) further expanded upon Paternoster’s (1989) conceptual refinement with
his ethnographic study of crack dealers. More specifically, Jacobs (1996a) identified, and found
support for, two distinct types of restrictive deterrence: probabilistic and particularistic.
Probabilistic restrictive deterrence refers to that suggested by Gibbs (1975), which is a
curtailment in offense frequency based on an odds, or law of averages mentality (Jacobs, 1996a).
In other words, offenders commit less crime in hopes that it will decrease their probability of
getting caught. Particularistic restrictive deterrence however, refers to the modification of
behavior based on “tactical skills offenders use that make them less likely to be apprehended”
(Jacobs, 1996a, p. 425). Tactical skills vary by offense, but are developed as a mechanism to
avoid punishment. Moreover, in contrast to Gibbs (1975), Jacobs (1996a) contended that
restrictive deterrence could be a function of either specific or general deterrence, or in some
cases both simultaneously. More specifically, restrictive deterrence has a specific deterrent effect
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when one has been previously sanctioned, a general deterrent effect when one has heard others
have been sanctioned, and an interaction effect between the two when both instances have
occurred (Jacobs, 1996a). Therefore, in essence, both specific and general deterrence can affect
all people through the experience of punishment, and it is common that both types affect the
same person (Jacobs, 1996a).
Direct empirical examinations of restrictive deterrence are relatively scarce (Gallupe,
Bouchard, & Caulkins, 2011; Jacobs, 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014; Jacobs
& Miller, 1998; Paternoster, 1989), qualitative in nature (Jacobs, 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Jacobs &
Cherbonneau, 2014), and reliant on small samples (Jacobs, 1996b; Jacobs & Cherbonneau,
2014). Despite these limitations, the aforementioned studies have played an important role in our
understanding of how offenders attempt to reduce their risk of sanctions.
For example, Jacobs and Cherbonneau (2014) found support for particularistic restrictive
deterrence, in that auto thieves reduce their risk of punishment in three ways: discretionary target
selection, normalcy illusions, and defiance. Simply put, discretionary target selection is choosing
to steal a car that will not be as easily recognizable. This technique aligns with past target
hardening research, in that offenders chose easier targets (Cromwell & Olson, 2004; Rengert &
Wasilchick, 1989; Wright & Decker, 1994, 1997). The normalcy illusion involves using specific
tactics to keep authorities, victims, and witnesses from becoming wise (Goffman, 1963).
Defiance refers to the rejection of sanction threats (Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014). In other
words, defiance is the avoidance of apprehension by fleeing the scene once caught. These
techniques exemplify the ways in which punishment is avoided at all stages of the auto burglary
process. Auto thieves employ discretionary target selection when deciding which car to steal.
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Once they have successfully stolen a car they elude police detection with the normalcy illusion.
If the above techniques fail, the auto thief is defiant and ready to flee the scene.
Jacobs (1993) examined perceptual shorthands dealers use to determine whether buyers
in question are undercover police officers. He found two commonly used perceptual shorthands,
which he later refers to as tactical skills (Jacobs, 1996a): trend discontinuity and interpersonal
illegitimacy. Trend discontinuity is when familiar customers introduce unfamiliar others who
desire to buy drugs, and when familiar customers suddenly and significantly increase the
quantities in which they wish to purchase (Jacobs, 1993). Dealers become skeptical and begin
worrying that the familiar buyer has become a police informant. Interpersonal illegitimacy is
when unfamiliar buyers radiate certain vibes believed to be indicative of an undercover agent
(Jacobs, 1993). Jacobs and Miller (1998) found that female crack dealers avoid detection in a
similar manner, yet are typically much more discrete. Although being discrete makes it harder
for police to detect a female dealer, it also limits their customer base.
Gallupe and colleagues (2011) applied the concept of restrictive deterrence to a sample of
drug market offenders. More specifically, they assessed the influence of behavioral changes postarrest on time to re-arrest (Gallupe, Bouchard, & Caulkins, 2011). They found that switching
location is correlated to more rapid re-arrest, unless dealing with cannabis cultivation, in which
changing location leads to a longer period before re-arrest (Gallupe, Bouchard, & Caulkins,
2011).
Although direct empirical examinations of restrictive deterrence are still relatively scarce,
there is a large body of literature that indirectly examines the concept of restrictive deterrence
under situational crime prevention and routine activity theory. Situational crime prevention, as
defined by Clarke (1997), is “ (1) directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) involves the
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management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and
permanent way as possible, (3) makes crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and
excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders” (p. 4). Clark (1997) continues by listing a
plethora of successful situational crime prevention measures aimed to curtail criminal behavior:
surveillance cameras for subway systems and parking facilities, defensible space
architecture in public housing, target hardening of apartment blocks and individual
residences, electronic access for cars and for telephone systems, street closures and traffic
schemes for residential neighborhoods, alcohol controls at festivals and sporting fixtures,
training in conflict management for publicans and bouncers, and improved stocktaking
and record keeping procedures in warehouse and retail outlets. (p.3)
Moreover, Clark (1997) contends that it is common for the average person to routinely utilize
situational crime prevention measures to avoid being victimized such as locking the door,
securing valuables, buying houses in safe neighborhoods, investing in burglar alarms, and
avoiding dangerous people and places.
Situational crime prevention dates back to the 1960s and 1970s with work on correctional
treatments conducted by the Home Office Research Unit, the British government's
criminological research department (Clarke & Cornish, 1983). Arguably most influential was the
finding that school children misbehave based on their opportunity to do so rather than their
personality or background; therefore, Tizard and colleagues (1975) thought it possible to design
out misbehavior.
Support for the Home Office position was found in criminological literature on property
offending (Burt, 1925), childhood dishonest behavior (Hartshorne & May, 1928), and
geographical studies on auto burglary (Wilkins, 1964). The Home Office position also paralleled
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contemporary psychological research. Examples include the work of Mischel (1968), who found
that situational influences played a greater role in shaping individual behavior than previously
thought, and Matza (1964) who contended that individuals drift into deviancy rather than adhere
to a strong deviant bond.
Tedeschi and Felson (1994) extended situational crime prevention measures to even the
most serious of crimes. For example, they found that homicide is influenced by availability of
handguns (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Similarly, Wilkinson (1986) accredited the virtual
elimination of aircraft hijackings to increased baggage screening, and Gabor (1990) and
Grandjean (1990) accredited the reduction in bank robberies to target hardening techniques, such
as bulletproof glass windows.
At the same time situational crime prevention was gaining momentum in Britain, scholars
in the United States were developing similar concepts such as defensible space (Newman, 1972)
and crime prevention through environmental design or CPTED (Jeffery, 1971). Newman (1972)
provided empirical support linking large-scale public housing buildings to increased crime rates.
He argued that the design of public housing makes it impossible to know your neighbors, which
discourages residents from exercising their normal territorial instincts to exclude offenders
(Newman, 1972). Similarly, Jeffery’s CPTED drew from the biosocial theory of learning and
“argued that punishment and treatment philosophies had to be abandoned in favor of a preventive
approach which took due account of both genetic predisposition and the physical environment”
(Clarke, 1997, p. 8).
In addition to CPTED and situational crime prevention, restrictive deterrence draws
support from routine activity theory. Routine activity theory states that three elements must be
present for a crime to occur: a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable
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guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Paralleling the literature on restrictive deterrence, Cohen and
Felson (1979) found that the shift to a greater participation of women in the workforce led to an
increase in burglaries due to the greater proportion of empty houses. In other words, the increase
in burglaries can be accredited to the decrease in restrictive deterrence that resulted from
burglars’ decreased fear of sanctions.
Further advancements in deterrence literature suggest that for the deterrence process to be
successful, warning messages must be displayed to the target audience (Geerken & Gove, 1975).
A large body of literature has examined the effectiveness of warning offenders of possible
sanctions, but found mixed results (Coleman, 2007; Decker, 1972; Eck & Wartell, 1998;
Grabosky, 1996; Lowman, 1992; Rama & Kulmala, 2000). For example, warning banners have
no effect on prostitution (Loman, 1992), yet decrease unsafe driving (Rama & Kulmala, 2000),
tax evasion (Coleman, 2007) and open drug dealing (Eck & Wartell, 1998). Interestingly,
warning banners have an adverse effect on petty crimes such as pickpocketing (Grabosky, 1996).
For these petty crimes, Grabosky (1996) suggested that waning banners act as advertisement,
thus encouraging illicit behavior. The present study seeks to extend these empirical examinations
to cyberspace.
Deterrence in Cyberspace
Although an immense body of restrictive deterrence literature has accumulated,
criminologists have failed to examine its relevance in cyberspace, until Maimon and colleagues’
(2014) study. Maimon and colleagues (2014) employed target computers on a large American
university and conducted two independent experiments to examine the influence of a single
warning banner on the progression, frequency, and duration of system trespassing incidents. The
target computers in both experiments were programed to exhibit or not to exhibit a warning
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banner once hackers had successfully infiltrated the systems. Maimon and colleagues (2014)
found that a warning banner significantly increases the rate of first system trespassing
termination, and decreases the duration of first trespassing incidents. The findings emphasized
the relevance of restrictive deterrence in cyberspace, which were later corroborated by research
in information technology (Stockman, Heile, & Rein, 2015).
Due to the success of Maimon and colleagues’ (2014) study, the deterrent effect of
warning banners has gained an increasing amount of criminological attention (Jones, 2014;
Wilson, Maimon, Sobesto, & Cukier, 2015). For example, Jones (2014) examined system
trespassers’ behavior using a non-American computer network. Similar to Maimon and
colleagues (2014), the target computers used in Jones’ (2014) study were programed to exhibit or
not to exhibit a warning banner once hackers had successfully infiltrated the systems. Unlike the
Maimon and colleagues (2014) study, Jones (2014) utilized three warning banners: an altruistic
message used for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction threat (warning 2), and an
ambiguous threat (warning 3). In doing this, Jones (2014) was able to look beyond the frequency
and duration of a system trespass, and instead examine the effects of different warning banners
on individual keystrokes. Interestingly, Jones (2014) found that the altruistic message had a
deterrent effect; whereas the legal sanction threat and ambiguous threat increased command
usage.
Wilson and colleagues (2015) examined whether the presence of a surveillance banner on
a compromised computer system influenced attackers’ engagement with the compromised
system. A compromised computer system is a computer that has been successfully infiltrated. In
doing this, they found that the presence of a surveillance message in the compromised computer
systems decreased the probability of commands being typed in the system during longer first
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system trespassing incidents (Wilson, Maimon, Sobesto, & Cukier, 2015). Further, they found
that the probability of commands being logged during subsequent system trespassing incidents
(on the same target computer) is influenced by the presence of a warning banner and by whether
commands have been entered during previous attacks (Wilson, Maimon, Sobesto, & Cukier,
2015). An attack is the logging of one or more keystroke commands.
Prior to Maimon and colleagues’ (2014) study there were no empirical works examining
restrictive deterrence in cyberspace; however, a growing body of literature in the realm of
cyberdefense has investigated the utility of deterrent strategies involving denial of attack
(Goodman, 2010). Cyberdefense deterrent strategies seek to deter through target hardening.
In addition, Goodman (2010) used real-world cases to demonstrate that it is possible to
deter cyber attacks as long as the intent to enforce penalties is known by the potential offender.
However, there are numerous problems concerning deterrence in cyberspace. Furnell (2002)
found that law regarding cybercrime was unknown to the hacking community. This is
problematic because people cannot be deterred by the threat of sanction if they do not know their
actions are punishable (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]). Moreover, even those who recognize the
illegality of system trespassing are not likely to be deterred due to the lack of stigma attached to
computer crimes (Taylor, 1999; Yar, 2005). In fact, Yar (2005) states that a significant amount
of youth participate in computer crime, and many deem it socially acceptable. Similarly, Taylor
(1999) states that many believe hacking is a mere phase, in which active youth will mature out.
Although previous studies found that stigma does not deter cybercrime as it does some crimes in
the physical world (Yar, 2005), the work of Goodman (2010), Maimon and colleagues (2014),
Jones (2014), and Wilson and colleagues (2015) contend that these crimes can be deterred in
other ways.
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Deterrence in cyberspace is also undermined by hackers’ lack of fear for legal sanctions.
It is well known within the hacking community that the criminal justice system lacks the ability
to effectively police cybercrime (Choi, 2010). More specifically, Choi (2010) provided an
empirical examination of routine activity theory in cyberspace and found that cyberspace lacks a
capable guardian. By introducing warning banners that are suggestive of a capable guardian, the
current study is able to offer a unique analysis of restrictive deterrence on post-compromised
systems that extends beyond the scope of the Choi (2010) study.
Conversely, there is evidence in the literature that shows hackers utilize particularistic
restrictive deterrence tactics similar to those described by Jacobs (1996a). More specifically, it is
not uncommon for hackers to hide their identity through looping, using one computer to access
another, and then another, and so on (Jones, 2014). Similarly, hackers often erase traces of their
trespassing and create a backdoor into the system, thus allowing them to freely re-enter without
being noticed (Wang, 2006). Wang (2006) found that oftentimes hackers do this by gaining
control of the system administrator’s account. Once hackers have gained control of the system
administrator’s account they can more easily make desired modifications.
These findings, along with the findings of Maimon and colleagues (2014) and Jones
(2014) suggest the need for greater investigation into the restrictive deterrence techniques used
by system trespassers. Criminologists have virtually ignored particularistic restrictive deterrence
in cyberspace. The current study seeks to partially fill this gap in the literature by examining the
temporal order of specific keystroke commands (a special set of keys that execute a command)
that are logged by system trespassers during an intrusion. Examining the temporal order of these
keystroke commands in relation to the treatment or control conditions allows us to examine the
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extent to which system trespassers modify their behavior after encountering various warning
messages. This is a unique test of particularistic restrictive deterrence.
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The Current Study
As discussed above, Jones (2014) expanded upon the Maimon and colleagues (2014)
study in various ways. Most influential for the progression of the current study was her ability to
examine the frequency of individual keystroke commands. In addition, she divided the
commands into three categories based on their general functions: change commands,
reconnaissance commands, and fetch commands (Jones, 2014). Change commands “change files,
access permissions, or process on the computer” (Jones, 2014, p. 26). The commands included
are adduser/useradd, passwd, chmod, rm –rf, touch, and kill/killall. Fetch commands are
designed to do as the name suggests and “fetch files from other networks and bring them to the
compromised computer” (Jones, 2014, p. 26). The commands included are wget, tar, and ftp.
Reconnaissance commands, as defined by Jones (2014), are used to “report information about
the computer’s contents and processes” (p. 26). The commands included are w, uname, ps,
uptime, and Is. Table 1 displays all of the aforementioned commands and their purpose.
Table 1. Command List
Command
adduser/useradd
Passwd
Chmod
rm –rf
Touch
kill/killall
Wget

Command Description
Creates a new user account
Changes the password
Changes access permissions
Removes files and/or directories.
Creates new, empty files and is used to change timestamps
Terminates processes
Downloads files

Tar

Extracts files

ftp

Transfers files from or to a remote network

W

Shows whether other users are logged into the system and their activity

Uname

Reports basic information about the computer’s hardware and software

Ps

Reports on current processes

Uptime

Shows whether other users are logged on and how long the system has
been running
Lists all files

Is
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As seen in Table 1, the information reported by the various reconnaissance commands
can be associated with the perceived probability of detection. In other words, a hacker may use
reconnaissance commands to scope out the existence of a capable guardian in the same fashion a
burglar checks to see if someone is home before breaking and entering. Similar to the burglar,
the system trespasser is likely to become more cautious as his fear of detection increases;
therefore, reconnaissance commands are employed by system trespassers as a tactical skill to
avoid detection.
The grouping of these various commands has additional importance that expands beyond
the scope of the Jones (2014) study. More specifically, it allows for the examination of
particularistic restrictive deterrence in cyberspace after exposure to three individual warning
banners: an altruistic message used for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction threat
(warning 2), and an ambiguous threat (warning 3). As defined above, particularistic restrictive
deterrence is the modification of behavior based on “tactical skills offenders use that make them
less likely to be apprehended” (Jacobs, 1996a, p. 425).
Although not specifically tested, partial support for the existence of particularistic
restrictive deterrence in cyberspace was found in Cherbonneau and Copes’ (2006) study, which
determined that system trespassers modify their behavior by logging specific commands to
conceal their activity. In addition, Kigerl (2014) found that spammers take extra precautions
when they feel that their identity is at risk of exposure. Moreover, Jones (2014) found that
hackers who encounter the altruistic message are less likely than those who encounter the legal
sanction threat or ambiguous threat to log any of the aforementioned reconnaissance commands;
however, this finding was not pronounced enough to obtain statistical significance. A more
effective measure of particularistic restrictive deterrence, which is tested within the current
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study, is the temporal order in which reconnaissance commands are logged. As we know from
the literature on deterrence in the physical world, the effects of deterrence fades as offenders’
perceived certainty of punishment decreases (Pogarsky, Piquero, & Paternoster, 2004).
Therefore, it is intuitive that hackers will employ tactical skills in the early stages of their attack.
More specifically, hackers who are more concerned with detection will log reconnaissance
commands sooner than those less concerned with detection.
Due to the nature of the study I can only speculate on the reasons some hackers are more
concerned with detection than others. However, I can use theory and prior research to guide my
speculations. For example, Beccaria (1963 [1764]) contended that people cannot be deterred by
the threat of sanction if they do not know their actions are punishable. Therefore, it is likely that
those who are presented with a legal sanction threat will be more concerned with detection than
those in the control group due to their increased awareness of the illegality of system trespassing
and their perceived notion of a capable guardian. Moreover, prior research suggests that
ambiguity increases the perceived certainty of sanctions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Loughran et al., 2011); therefore, hackers who receive the ambiguous threat should also be more
concerned with detection than those in the control group.
The Jones (2014) study demonstrates that the altruistic message has a probabilistic rather
than a particularistic restrictive deterrent effect. Moreover, system trespassers who encounter the
altruistic message are not given an adequate reason to fear detection. Attempting to use moral
persuasion to deter system trespassing may even serve as an indicator that the system lacks a
capable guardian. Therefore, I am inclined to speculate that hackers who encounter the altruistic
message will be less concerned with detection than those in the control group. In other words,
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system trespassers in the control group will utilize reconnaissance commands at an earlier stage
in their attack than those who encounter the altruistic message aimed at moral persuasion.
These speculations, which are grounded in theory and prior research, lead to the
following hypotheses:
1. System trespassers who encounter the legal sanction threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers in the control group.
2. System trespassers who encounter the ambiguous threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers in the control group.
3. System trespassers who encounter the legal sanction threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers who encounter the
altruistic message.
4. System trespassers who encounter the ambiguous threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers who encounter the
altruistic message.
5. System trespassers who do not encounter a warning banner (the control group) will log a
reconnaissance command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers who
encounter the altruistic message.
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Methodology
Procedure
Maimon and colleagues (2014) conducted a pilot experiment, which examined attackers’
post-compromised behavior using one experimental condition (the presence of a standard legal
warning) and one control condition (no warning message). The warning banner used in the
original study addressed the legality of system trespassing. Due to the success of the study, two
additional treatment groups were included and tested on both American and non-American
network infrastructures using honeypot computers.
A honeypot computer, as defined by Spitzner (2003) is, “a security resource whose value
lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” (p. 3). Honeypot computers are designed to be
easy prey for system trespassers, with slight modification that allows activity to be logged (Even,
2000). It is believed that once a system is compromised, intruders will make subsequent visits,
thus making honeypot computers ideal for collecting data (Even, 2000).
The current study utilizes the same dataset used in the Jones (2014) study, which was
gathered from a Chinese University computer network, where 295 high-interaction honeypots
were set up. Similar to the Maimon and colleagues (2014) study, the target computers were
programed to exhibit or not to exhibit a warning banner once hackers had successfully infiltrated
the systems. Building on Maimon and colleagues (2014) study, the current study utilizes three
warning banners: an altruistic message used for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction
threat (warning 2), and an ambiguous threat (warning 3) (see Appendix for banner content).
To ensure endogeneity, system trespassers were randomly assigned to the four conditions
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once they attempted to gain access by means of brute force (guessing the password a
predetermined number of times). For the current study, the threshold was set to be a random
number between 150 and 200 to emulate an authentic attack. Once access was granted to the
honeypot systems, all of which ran Linux Ubuntu 9.10 with a modified version of an OpenSSH
server. Intruders were allowed access to the honeypot computer for a period of thirty days, and
were free to use the computer as they pleased. However, a firewall was employed to prevent
hackers from engaging in activities harmful to other devices. Keystrokes were logged using the
Sebek keylogger. After the thirty-day access period trespassers were kicked off the honeypot
computer, it was cleaned, and redeployed.
Data
The honeypot computers were compromised 1,548 times, 478 of which the hackers
executed an attack (logged 1 or more keystroke command). Since the modification of behavior
can only be examined where behavior exists, the 478 attacks became the total sample. Of the
total sample, 132 were not exposed to a warning banner (control group), 81 were exposed to the
altruistic message, 135 to the legal warning, and 130 to the ambiguous threat. Table 2 displays
the frequency of overall command usage. As seen in table 2, the median number of commands
logged is five, the mean number is 7.55, and the first quartile falls at two commands logged.
Therefore, the current study conceptualizes the early use of a reconnaissance command as the
first or second command logged.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Frequency of Command Usage
Mean

7.55

Median

5

Range

43

First Quartile

2
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Analytic Strategy
To test the various hypotheses two dummy variables were created for each of the five
reconnaissance commands. The first dummy variable indicates that the specific reconnaissance
command was the first command logged by the system trespasser. The second dummy variable
indicates that the specific reconnaissance command was the first or second command logged by
the system trespasser. The dummy variables were then used to create a measure for all
reconnaissance commands logged first, and another measure for all reconnaissance commands
logged first or second. In other words, the current study first examined the reconnaissance
commands individually then examined their combined significance.
Using the chi-square test of significance the current study was able to determine whether
a significant difference exists between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in
the various treatment groups. Similarly, by running a series of logistic regressions the present
study was able to measure the relationship between logging a reconnaissance command at an
early stage within an attack (the dependent variable) and the different warning banners (the
independent variable). More specifically, the current study was able to determine which, if any,
of the warning banners were associated with a higher rate of reconnaissance commands logged
early in the attack.
In total, 12 measures of the dependent variable are included within the analyses (two for
each of the five reconnaissance commands and the two summated measures). Since the data were
collected using a randomized experimental design control variables are not included, nor are they
needed.
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Results
Table 3 presents the results (as percentages) of a series of bivariate cross-tabulations
between honeypot type and the early use of various reconnaissance commands. The Chi-square
test of significance did not yield statistically significant results; however, noteworthy findings
exist throughout the analysis. Regarding the first two hypotheses, hackers who encounter the
legal or ambiguous message are more likely to log a reconnaissance command at an early stage
in their attack than those in the control group for seven of the twelve variables examined.
Similarly, hackers who receive the legal sanction threat are more likely to log a reconnaissance
command at an early stage in their attack than those who receive the altruistic message for seven
of the twelve variables examined. Addressing the fourth hypothesis, hackers who receive the
ambiguous threat are more likely to log a reconnaissance command at an early stage in their
attack than those who receive the altruistic message for eight of the twelve variables examined.
Lastly, addressing the fifth hypothesis, hackers in the control group are more likely to log a
reconnaissance command at an early stage in their attack than those who encounter the altruistic
message for eight of the twelve variables examined. Although none of which are statistically
significant, the majority of findings are in the anticipated direction. In other words, the current
study’s hypotheses accurately predicted which warning banners most influence the early use of
reconnaissance commands.
A more in depth consideration of the percentages provide additional interesting findings.
For example, 70% of those who receive the standard legal warning log a reconnaissance
command as the first or second command within their attack, which is the large majority. An
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examination of individual commands show that some commands are used a great deal more than
others across all of the treatment groups. For example, 46% of those who receive the ambiguous
threat log W as the first or second command within their attack, whereas only 5% log Uptime.
This is interesting because, as seen in Table 1, both commands inform the hacker on whether or
not anyone else is logged onto the system. The decreased usage of the other reconnaissance
commands is more intuitive since they do not directly relate to the existence of a capable
guardian.
Table 4 displays the results of a series of logistic regressions. Support for the hypotheses
were not found. As seen below, the various logistic regression models lack statistical
significance, with the only significant finding being that those who encounter the ambiguous
threat are more likely to log uname as the first command within their attack (b=2.15, SE=1.07,
p=0.044). In other words, encountering the ambiguous threat in comparison to not encountering a
warning banner increases the odds of logging uname as the first command within an attack by
758.49%. However, it is likely that this finding gained statistical significance due to the small
percentage of hackers who logged the command. It was only logged 17 times, which is the least
of any of the various reconnaissance commands.
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Table 3. Percent of Command Usage: Bivariate Cross-Tabulations
Command Name Control
Altruistic
Legal
Ambiguous
Recon 1st
61%
56%
62%
62%
Recon 1st or 2nd

66%

67%

70%

68%

W 1st

40%

37%

38%

42%

W 1st or 2nd

44%

41%

42%

46%

Uname 1st

1%

5%

3%

6%

Uname 1st or 2nd

11%

9%

13%

12%

Ps 1st

11%

9%

7%

5%

Ps 1st or 2nd

20%

19%

14%

12%

Uptime 1st

3%

4%

3%

4%

Uptime 1st or 2nd

3%

6%

4%

5%

Is 1st

7%

5%

11%

7%

Is 1st or 2nd

18%

15%

26%

18%
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Output
Command name
Recon 1st

Altruistic
Coef: -.189
Std. Err.: .287
P>|z|: 0.509

Legal
Coef: .036
Std. Err.: .252
P>|z|: 0.885

Ambiguous
Coef:.007
Std. Err.: .254
P>|z|: 0.977

Recon 1st or 2nd

Coef: .034
Std. Err.: .299
P>|z|: 0.910

Coef: .206
Std. Err.: .263
P>|z|: 0.434

Coef: .116
Std. Err.: .263
P>|z|: 0.660

W 1st

Coef: -.131
Std. Err.: .291
P>|z|: 0.651

Coef: -.100
Std. Err.: .251
P>|z|: 0.691

Coef: .057
Std. Err.: .252
P>|z|: 0.819

W 1st or 2nd

Coef: -.131
Std. Err.: .286
P>|z|: 0.647

Coef: -.070
Std. Err.: .247
P>|z|: 0.777

Coef: .089
Std. Err.: .248
P>|z|: 0.719

Uname 1st

Coef: 1.92
Std. Err.: 1.13
P>|z|: 0.089

Coef: 1.39
Std. Err.: 1.12
P>|z|: 0.218

Coef: 2.15
Std. Err.: 1.07
P>|z|: 0.044*

Uname 1st or 2nd

Coef: -.227
Std. Err.: .486
P>|z|: 0.64

Coef: .194
Std. Err.: .384
P>|z|: 0.613

Coef: .095
Std. Err.: .394
P>|z|: 0.810

Ps 1st

Coef: -.227
Std. Err.: .486
P>|z|: 0.641

Coef: -.394
Std. Err.: .433
P>|z|: 0.363

Coef: .735
Std. Err.: .481
P>|z|: 0.126

Ps 1st or 2nd

Coef: -.076
Std. Err.: .360
P>|z|: 0.832

Coef: -.404
Std. Err.: .330
P>|z|: 0.222

Coef: -.558
Std. Err.: .345
P>|z|: 0.106

Uptime 1st

Coef: .208
Std. Err.: .777
P>|z|: 0.789

Coef: -.023
Std. Err.: .718
P>|z|: 0.974

Coef: .247
Std. Err.: .683
P>|z|:0.718

Uptime 1st or 2nd

Coef: .744
Std. Err.: .686
P>|z|: 0.278

Coef: .398
Std. Err.: .657
P>|z|: 0.545

Coef: .599
Std. Err.: .639
P>|z|: 0.348

Is 1st

Coef: -.343
Std. Err.: .618
P>|z|: 0.580

Coef: .536
Std. Err.: .441
P>|z|: 0.224

Coef: .016
Std. Err.: .488
P>|z|: 0.973

Is 1st or 2nd

Coef: -.245
Std. Err.: .386
P>|z|: -0.64

Coef: .454
Std. Err.: .299
P>|z|: 0.129

Coef: .019
Std. Err.: .319
P>|z|: 0.953

* P < 0.05
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Discussion
System trespassing, the unauthorized access of computer systems, has become a
worldwide phenomenon, which costs the global economy $400 billion annually (McAfee, 2014).
Despite the growing concern criminologists remained relatively silent until Maimon and
colleagues’ (2014) study. Maimon and colleagues (2014) sparked criminological interest by
finding that a warning banner significantly increases the rate of first system trespassing
termination, and decreases the duration of first trespassing incidents. These findings were
interpreted as preliminary evidence for the relevance of restrictive deterrence in cyberspace.
Jones (2014) expanded upon Maimon and colleagues’ (2014) study by examining the
influence of three warning banners on system trespassers’ behavior: an altruistic message used
for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction threat (warning 2), and an ambiguous threat
(warning 3). More specifically, she examined the effects of the different warning banners on
individual keystrokes. Interestingly, she found that the altruistic message has a deterrent effect,
whereas the legal sanction threat and ambiguous threat do not. However, most influential to the
current study was her grouping of the various keystroke commands.
Jones (2014) divided the commands into three categories based on their general
functions: change commands, reconnaissance commands, and fetch commands. Due to their
theoretical relevance the current study only focuses on reconnaissance commands, which are
used to “report information about the computer’s contents and processes” (Jones, 2014, p. 26).
Given their intended purpose, reconnaissance commands can be associated with perceived
probability of detection. In other words, a hacker may use reconnaissance commands to check
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for a capable guardian in cyberspace the same way a burglar checks for a capable guardian in the
physical world. Similar to the burglar, system trespassers are likely to become more cautious as
their fear of detection increases; therefore, reconnaissance commands are employed by system
trespassers as a tactical skill to avoid detection. The most effective measure of particularistic
restrictive deterrence, which is tested within the current study, is the temporal order in which
reconnaissance commands are logged. It is intuitive that hackers who are more concerned with
detection will log reconnaissance commands sooner than those less concerned with detection.
Drawing from theory and prior research (as discussed above), the following hypotheses were
developed:

1. System trespassers who encounter the legal sanction threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers in the control group.
2. System trespassers who encounter the ambiguous threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers in the control group.
3. System trespassers who encounter the legal sanction threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers who encounter the
altruistic message.
4. System trespassers who encounter the ambiguous threat will log a reconnaissance
command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers who encounter the
altruistic message.
5. System trespassers who do not encounter a warning banner (the control group) will log a
reconnaissance command at an earlier stage in their attack than system trespassers who
encounter the altruistic message.
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The current study utilizes the same dataset used in the Jones (2014) study, which was
gathered from a Chinese University computer network, where 295 high-interaction honeypots
were set up. The honeypot computers (computers designed to be attacked in order to collect data)
were programed to randomly exhibit or not to exhibit a warning banner once hackers had
successfully infiltrated the systems. The current study utilizes three warning banners: an
altruistic message used for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction threat (warning 2), and
an ambiguous threat (warning 3).
In total the honeypots were compromised 1,548 times, 478 of which the hackers executed
an attack (logged 1 or more keystroke command). The 478 attacks became my total sample since
the modification of behavior can only be examined where behavior exists. Of the total sample,
132 were not exposed to a warning banner (control group), 81 were exposed to the altruistic
message, 135 to the legal warning, and 130 to the ambiguous threat.
To test the aforementioned hypotheses two dummy variables were created for each of the
five reconnaissance commands. The first dummy variable indicates that the reconnaissance
command was the first command logged, and the second dummy variable indicates that the
reconnaissance command was the first or second command logged. Two additional dummy
variables were created. The first indicates that any of the reconnaissance commands were the
first command logged, and the second indicates that any of the reconnaissance commands were
the first of second command logged. In total, the analyses have 12 dependent variables (two for
each of the five reconnaissance commands, and two summated measures).
A series of bivariate cross tabulations were run to determine whether a significant
difference exists between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in the various
treatment groups. Similarly, a series of logistic regressions were run to measure the relationship
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between logging a reconnaissance command at an early stage within an attack (the dependent
variable) and the different warning banners (the independent variable).
Although the bivariate cross tabulations did not yield statistically significant results, the
majority of findings are in the anticipated direction. In other words, the current study’s
hypotheses accurately predicted which warning banners most influence the early use of
reconnaissance commands. The various logistic regression models also lacked statistical
significance, with the only significant finding being that those who encounter the ambiguous
threat are more likely to log uname as the first command within their attack, which is likely due
to the limited number of hackers who logged this specific command. Therefore, the logistic
regression models do not provide support for the hypotheses.
Although the current study lacks statistical significance, it adds to that found by Maimon
and colleagues (2014) and Jones (2014) by examining tactical skills that hackers use to avoid
detection. Research aimed to examine hackers’ behavior can inform those working in cyber
security whilst adding to a relatively new body of literature; however, additional studies are
imperative.
A post hoc speculation is that the current study may have failed to obtain statistical
significance due to various limitations within the study, in which future research should attempt
to address. As previously mentioned, the current study’s data were collected from a Chinese
computer system, which may prevent a percentage of hackers from being able to read the content
of the warning banners. If the hackers were not able to understand the message, it is intuitive that
it would not have deterred them.
In addition, the unit of analysis in the current study is the attack rather than the hacker,
which limits the study in various ways. For example, it is possible that the same hacker
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compromised more than one honeypot, which threatens the validity of the study due to the
possibility that a hacker encountered more than one warning banner. Additional analyses aimed
to examine the diminishing effects of warning banners on hackers’ behavior during subsequent
attacks would have made for a stronger study; however, this was not possible given that different
hackers could potentially hack from the same IP address, and that the same hacker could
potentially hack from different IP addresses. Future studies should examine the initial attack
separately, as it is more likely that the deterrent effect will be pronounced.
It is also likely that the current study failed to yield statistical significant results due to the
deterrent effect that was observed in Maimon and colleagues’ (2014) study and Jones’ (2014)
study. More specifically, it is likely that those who would have utilized tactical skills to avoid
detection were instead completely deterred from logging any keystroke command. Therefore, it
is possible that the current study failed to capture existing restrictive deterrent effects due to a
biased sample. Although it is not possible to conclude with any certainty, a plausible speculation
is that inherent differences exist between those who encountered a warning banner and decided
to attack the compromised computer and those who did not. Future studies should attempt to
parse out these differences.
Lastly, future studies should examine other tactical skills that hackers use to avoid
detection. It is entirely possible that hackers avoid detection in a number of ways. Better
understanding the ways in which hackers avoid detection will not only advance scientific
knowledge, but also inform system administrators on ways to protect their system from
becoming compromised.
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Appendix: Warning Banners
Altruistic Warning (Treatment 1):
Greetings friend, We congratulate you on gaining access to our system, but must request that
you not negatively impact our system. Sincerely, Over-worked admin
Standard Legal Warning (Treatment 2):
The actual or attempted unauthorized access, use, or modification of this system is strictly
prohibited. Unauthorized users are subject to Institutional disciplinary proceedings and/or
criminal and civil penalties under state, federal, or other applicable domestic or foreign laws. The
use of this system is monitored and recorded for administrative and security reasons. Anyone
accessing this system expressly consents to such monitoring and is advised that if monitoring
reveals possible evidence of criminal activity, the Institution may provide evidence of such
activity to law enforcement officials.
Ambiguous Warning (Treatment 3):
We have acquired your IP address. Logout now and there will not be any consequences.
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